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Abstract: I analyze company news from Reuters with the `General In-
quirer' and relate measures of positive sentiment, negative sentiment and
disagreement to abnormal stock returns, stock and option trading vol-
ume, the volatility spread and the CDS spread. I test hypotheses derived
from market microstructure models. Consistent with these models, sen-
timent and disagreement are strongly related to trading volume. More-
over, sentiment and disagreement might be used to predict stock returns,
trading volume and volatility. Trading strategies based on positive and
negative sentiment are protable if the transaction costs are moderate,
indicating that stock markets are not fully ecient.
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JEL-classication: G12, G14
1Department of Economics, Box D-147, 78457 Konstanz, Germany, Phone: +49 7531 88 3620,
E-Mail: ferdinand.graf@uni-konstanz.de1 Introduction
Investors read daily newspapers, internet articles, watch TV news and listen to
the radio. The information obtained might aect their trading decision and, hence,
market prices, trading volume and volatility. Barber and Odean (2008) show that the
number of news releases by Dow Jones News Service is related to the trading behavior
of individual investors, but not institutional investors. Engelberg and Parsons (2011)
nd a causal relationship between nancial news articles in local newspapers and
the trading volume of local retail investors. However, news have many dimensions.
The number of relevant news articles for a company is a very restrictive measure and
ignores much information that might be important for nancial markets, e.g. the
sentiment. Tetlock (2007) and Gro-Klumann and Hautsch (2011) nd that the
sentiment of news articles predicts daily index returns, and intraday liquidity and
volatility, respectively. The sentiment of chat-room postings, which could contain
news as well, may have predictive power for nancial markets too, see Antweiler
and Frank (2004), Das, Matinez-Jeres and Tufano (2005) and Das and Chen (2007).
I build on these studies and construct a 
exible content analysis algorithm and
analyze company news from Reuters.
Reuters company news usually describe and interpret a wide range of facts and
events which might be relevant for companies. The author's interpretation and her
word choice may provide valuable information for nancial markets. The author's
view might account for the economic environment, the rm's industry position,
the management quality and much more aspects which are rather hard to measure
quantitatively. If the author concludes that some fact is positive news for a company,
she will use friendly and positive words to write the news story. If the facts are
considered as negative, alarmed and sad words will probably characterize the news
story. Of course, the quality of the author's comments depends on her background.
This makes the analysis of chat-room postings and their impact on the market
dicult, since everybody can post her opinion, rumors or lies without reputation
damage. Another advantage of Reuters company news is that it allows to study the
impact of heterogeneous events on nancial markets simultaneously.
I use the `General Inquirer' to measure the sentiment of a news story with respect to a
company and disagreement among news stories mechanically. The `General Inquirer'
assigns words to word categories. The word categories `positive' and `negative' are
used to measure positive and negative sentiment of news stories. Also, I use the
word categories `strong' and `weak' to measure the uncertainty of a news story. I
test if positive sentiment, negative sentiment and disagreement of Reuters company
news articles impact nancial markets. The data cover 62 large U.S. companies
listed at the NYSE or the Nasdaq with liquid stock option and CDS markets for the
time period June 01, 2007 to December 31, 2010.
First, I investigate the impact of sentiment and disagreement on the abnormal stock
return derived from the three factor Fama-French model, stock and option trading
volume, the volatility spread and the CDS spread using daily data. This analysis
1allows to test implications given by market microstructure models where investors
interpret public signals individually. My results are consistent with these models.
Second, I show that sentiment and disagreement have predictive power for (abnor-
mal) stock returns, stock trading volume and the volatility spread. Positive senti-
ment is frequently followed by positive (abnormal) returns and disagreement tends
to lower the (abnormal) return on the following day. The volatility spread increases
after negative sentiment and disagreement. Stock trading volume is signicantly
higher after news with positive sentiment, but disagreement reduces stock trading
volume at the following day. The latter nding is surprising and might be due to
immediate execution of scheduled orders, giving contradicting news articles.
Finally, I test the economic relevance of positive and negative sentiment by analyzing
trading strategies based on sentiment. Even with realistic transaction costs of 10
bps per round-trip, the trading strategies are comparable to approximate arbitrage
opportunities, indicating that the stock market is not fully ecient. For transaction
costs of 20 bps, the trading strategies are on average still protable, but bear a
substantial loss potential. The strategies cannot compensate transaction costs of 30
bps and more.
The contribution of this paper is manyfold. (1) I consider a large number of compa-
nies with liquid stock and derivative markets and analyze the relationship between
news articles and abnormal stock returns, stock and option trading volume, the
volatility spread and the CDS spread company individually. Hence, I do not aggre-
gate returns, etc., at the same day across companies. This distinguishes this study
from Tetlock (2007), who considers index returns, and from Das et. al. (2005),
who analyze four representative companies individually. (2) I analyze a comprehen-
sive and hand-collected dataset of news stories, downloaded from the homepage of
Reuters with a 
exible procedure, and extend Gro-Kluman and Hautsch (2011),
who relate pre-calculated dummy variables for positive and negative sentiment to
the stock market, using a continuous sentiment score. (3) The Reuters company
news are highly credible. This distinguishes this analysis from Antweiler and Frank
(2004) and Das and Chen (2007), who study chat-room postings. Das et. al. (2005)
analyze chat-room postings, too, claiming that these postings disseminate public
information. This paper analysis might contribute to those study since I analyze
news articles which might be closer to public information and, hence, less noisy. (4)
To my best knowledge, this study is the rst that analyzes the relationship between
sentiment respectively disagreement of general news articles and the CDS spread.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a literature review.
Section 3 derives testable hypotheses from market microstructure models. There-
after, I explain how market activity is measured. I describe my hand-collected news
database in section 4. Section 5 describes the content analysis and denes measures
for sentiment and disagreement. Thereafter, I relate these measures to the market
variables and develop trading strategies based on sentiment. Section 8 concludes
and gives an outlook for further research.
22 Related Literature
Several papers investigate the relationship between a company's publicity and the
stock market. Publicity often refers to the number of news articles on the company.
In an early study, Mitchell and Mulherin (1994) relate the number of news releases by
Dow Jones & Company to the absolute value of the market return, the absolute value
of rm-specic return and the trading volume. By controlling for macroeconomic
announcements and weekday eects, the study documents a signicant relationship
between news activity and market activity. Barber and Odean (2008) dene atten-
tion grabbing stocks as stocks with high abnormal trading volume, extreme returns
or news coverage. They show that individual investors are more likely to purchase
attention-grabbing stocks than other stocks. Engelberg and Parsons (2011) address
the causality between news articles and investors' behavior. They identify articles
on earnings announcement in local newspapers. Local news coverage predicts trad-
ing volume of local investors and gives strong support to a causal relationship from
news coverage to trading. Fang and Peress (2009) study the cross-section of stock
returns. They nd that stocks with media coverage, measured by the number of
articles on the company in the four major US newspapers (New York Times, USA
Today, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post), underperform stocks without media
coverage.
Of course, the number of news per day ignores the content of the news article.
Tetlock (2007) identies weak or negative words in the daily article 'Abreast of the
Market' in the Wall Street Journal with a content analysis algorithm, the `General
Inquirer'. He nds that the number of negative or weak words predicts the return of
the Dow Jones Industrial Average on the following day. This eect is oset within the
subsequent ve days and disappears after one week. Gro-Klumann and Hautsch
(2011) show that the sentiment of news articles and their relevance for stocks listed
at the LSE predict high frequency returns, volatility and liquidity. The sentiment
of a news article is calculated by Reuters and can take on only the values +1, 0 and
-1. The relevance of the news story determines the sensitivity of the market with
respect to the news article. Tetlock et. al. (2008) show that print news can predict
fundamental value as well as market value. However, trading strategies based on
these forecasts generate prots only if transaction costs are excluded. Carretta et.
al. (2010) study the Italian stock market and its reaction to corporate governance
news. News stories are analyzed with respect to content and tone, revealing that
the content of news on protable corporations is important to explain stock returns.
Several studies use a more general denition of news and analyze chat-room post-
ings. However, this kind of information is presumably more noisy and, hence, less
credible than regular news articles. Antweiler and Frank (2004) relate measures for
bullishness and disagreement in chat-room postings and chat-room activity to mar-
ket activity. Their main nding is that chat-room postings predict realized volatility
and trading volume, given high frequency data. Das, Martinez-Jerez and Tufano
(2005) analyze chat-room postings of four representative companies from dierent
industries and nd a contemporaneous relationships between the sentiment in in-
3vestors' conversations and market returns, but no predictive power. This motivates
their conclusion that investors rst trade and then talk. Das and Chen (2007) apply
a wide spectrum of text analysis algorithms to chat-rooms postings and develop
measures for sentiment and disagreement. Relating these measures to the stock
market return of a company shows that market activity is related to small investors'
sentiment. Tumarkin and Whitelaw (2001) analyze chat-room postings, too. How-
ever, their ndings on the interdependence between market observations and posted
news are inconclusive.
By using a narrow denition of news / events, the number of articles might be re-
duced signicantly and a mechanical content analysis might be redundant. Brooks,
Patel and Su (2003) analyze stock responses to rare, negative surprises like the
Exxon Valdes catastrophe, plane crashes or the sudden death of a CEO. They nd
that stocks respond with a delay to fully unanticipated news, but overreact, see also
Brourn and Derwall (2010), who study terrorist attacks and earthquakes, respec-
tively. Yu (2011) uses the dispersion in analyst forecasts to measure disagreement.
A portfolio of stocks with high disagreement underperforms compared to a portfolio
with low disagreement. Boyd, Hu and Jagannathan (2005) do not focus on rm spe-
cic news, they analyze unemployment reports and nd that stock markets respond
to unemployment news conditional on the state of the economy.
Not only stock prices seem to respond to textual information, there is evidence that
the price of credit derivatives and xed income securities do so as well. Norden (2008)
studies the relationship between the credit spread of credit default swaps and rating
announcements. He nds that the rating downgrade of a company is anticipated
by the company's major lenders, concluding that information spills over from the
major lenders to the market, see also Hull, Predrescu and White (2004). Hess et. al.
(2008) study the impact of macroeconomic news on commodity future price indices.
The index return responds to news about the in
ation rate or real activity only in
a recession. Hautsch and Hess (2002) analyze the U.S. employment report impact
on the mean and the volatility of T-bond futures returns. The mean's reaction
is related to surprises and the volatility's reaction is related to uncertainty in the
announcements. Besides of liquidity patterns, the study documents asymmetries in
the T-bond future price reaction to positive and negative news. Coval and Shumway
(2001) propose a very remarkable measure of information arrival, the ambient noise
in the CBOT trading pit. This measure predicts returns, liquidity and the customer
order 
ow of the 30 year U.S. treasury bond for several minutes.
3 Market Reactions
3.1 Hypotheses
The ecient market hypothesis says that market prices adjust immediately to public
information. I test this hypothesis. Hence
4Hypothesis 1: Market prices adjust immediately to public information,
leaving no predictive power for public company news.
Assuming homogeneous beliefs, the absence of private information and homogeneous
preferences, investors do not trade if new information becomes public, starting at an
equilibrium, see Milgrom and Stokey (1982). However, this is inconsistent with the
empirical studies cited before. Harris and Raviv (1993) and Kandel and Pearson
(1995) drop the assumption of homogeneous beliefs. They assume that investors
observe noisy, public signals and update their beliefs consistent with their individual
interpretation. Dierent levels of condence with respect to the noisy, public signal
across investors (dierence of opinion) might cause heterogenous changes in the
demand for risky assets and, hence, trading. Furthermore, Cao and Ou-Yang (2009)
extend this framework and show that public signals and heterogeneous priors may
also cause trading in stock options. Banerjee and Kremer (2010) relate a time-
varying magnitude of dierence of opinion to trading volume and price volatility
and nd that `periods of major disagreement are periods of higher volume and also
of higher absolute price changes'. The latter might be used as measure for volatility.
Company news might be closely related to public signals. Therefore, I approximate
the intensity of public company signals by the sentiment of relevant news stories.
The degree of dierences of opinion is approximated by the variation in the sentiment
of relevant news articles within on trading day, hereafter called disagreement. Hence
Hypothesis 2: Trading volume of stocks and options increases with
positive sentiment and negative sentiment.
Hypothesis 3: An increase in disagreement raises trading volume of
stocks and options.
Hypothesis 4: The stock return volatility increases with disagreement.
According to Hong and Stone (2007), heterogenous priors of investors are one ex-
planation why disagreement aects the stock market. Others are limited attention
or gradual information 
ow. However, these explanations have similar implications
on the relationship between the stock market and disagreement.
Another strand of literature explains trading patterns by information asymmetries
across investors. Blume, Easley and O'Hara (1994) show theoretically that trading
volume might contain valuable information to determine the precision of noisy, pri-
vate information and might be useful for stock pricing, see also Suominen (2001).
Tetlock (2010) analyzes market data around company announcements and nds pat-
tern which are consistent with information asymmetries. Sarwar (2005) and Kyr-
iacou and Sarno (1999) study option trading volume and market volatility. Both
studies nd a strong predictive power of option trading volume for volatility and
vice versa. Adjusting hedged portfolios to changes in volatility might explain why
volatility predicts option trading volume. Also, investors with private information
might exploit their informational advantage aggressively with options and use the
5leverage eect or bet on volatility via derivatives. Hence, trading volume might
predict volatility. By analyzing the ratio of traded put and call options, Pan and
Poteshman (2006) nd that stocks with low ratios signicantly outperform stocks
with high ratios. Again, this indicates that informed traders use derivates to benet
from their informational advantage.
Empirically, it is likely that evidence for - at least parts of - both strands of literature,
i.e. dierence of opinion and asymmetric information, appears jointly. I test the
implications given by the dierence of opinion theory, but allow for inter-temporal
dependencies between trading volume, stock volatility and returns to account for
information asymmetries. Furthermore, I include the CDS spread of a company for
two reasons: (1) Structure models for credit derivatives like Merton (1974) imply
that the equity market and the credit market are closely linked. Cremers et. al.
(2006) and Zhang, Zhou and Zhu (2009) document a close relationship between
credit markets and equity markets. Hence, I control for information spillovers from
debt to equity markets and vice versa. (2) I test if the CDS spread is related to the
degree of dierence of opinion and to public signals. Since equity volatility and the
unobservable asset volatility in structural models are positively related, the CDS
spread might also respond to a change in dierence of opinion, given that the equity
volatility reacts. Therefore
Hypothesis 5: The CDS spread increases with disagreement.
Furthermore, the CDS spread represents the market price of a traded derivative.
Predictability of the CDS spread might be related to market ineciency and to
Hypothesis 1.
3.2 Measures of Market Reactions
The daily close-to-close excess stock return of company i at day t, denoted ri;t,
might be used as a measure for the stock market's response to news releases. More
appropriate and in line with many other studies is the abnormal stock return, mea-
sured by the residuum in the three factor Fama-French model (hereafter FF model
/ factors / residuum), see Fama and French (1993). The residual measures the
stock price movements that are not due to common market risk factors but might
be due to rm-specic risk respectively news. The FF factors and the risk-free
interest rate are downloaded from the homepage of Kenneth French (see http:
//mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html), the divi-
dend adjusted stock prices are downloaded from Thomson Reuters Datastream. I
estimate
ri;t = i + i;MarketXMarket;t + SMB;iXSMB;t + HML;iXHML;t + "i;t; (1)
where i; denotes the factor loadings of the corresponding factor X;t (Market, Small
Minus Big market capitalization, High Minus Low book to market ratio). The
6estimated residuum is dened by ^ "i;t := ri;t   ^ ri;t, where ^ ri;t is the explained stock
return. If ^ "i;t is large in absolute value, it is likely that important rm-specic
information arrives. However, a residuum close to zero does not necessarily indicate
a calm trading day.
I measure the stock trading volume by the daily turnover volume, divided by the
average turnover volume in the preceding 3 months. This measure is denoted Ti;t.
To address the study of Sarwar (2005) and Kyriacou and Sarno (1999), and to test
the model of Cao and Ou-Yang (2009), I also include the cumulated option trading
volume of all outstanding options on stock i at day t, divided by its 3-month moving
average. This measure is denoted Oi;t. All time series are provided by Thomson
Reuters Datastream. I use the 3-month volatility spread, dened by
Vi;t = IVi;t   RVi;t;
to measure the investor expectations on volatility relative to realized volatility. IVi;t
is the at-the-money implied volatility of 3-month constant maturity options, calcu-
lated by Thomson Reuters Datastream. According to Martens and van Dijk (2007),







[(lnHi;s   lnLi;s)2   (2ln2   1)(lnRi;s)2];
where Hi;s is the highest intraday stock price within day s and Li;s is the lowest
intraday stock price. Ri;s is the close-to-close gross stock return of day s2. Finally, I
use the 5-year CDS spread on senior debt as an indicator for the company's default
risk. The CDS spreads is denoted Ci;t, the data are provided by CMA.
4 Company News
4.1 Data Description
My hand-collected database consists of mainly fundamental and unscheduled news
stories on companies in the S&P500, FTSE100 or EuroStoxx50 for the time period
June 01, 2007 to December 31, 2010. Given a date (mmddyyyy) and a company,
identied with its RIC (= Reuters instrument code), the domain Reuters.com
returns a list of up to ten news articles on the uniform resource locator http://www.
reuters.com/finance/stocks/companyNews?symbol=RIC&date=mmddyyyy. All
company news stories are downloaded mechanically. Long news stories might span
2The volatility spread measures the expected excess volatility relative to the realized volatility.
It might measure the risk aversion of the market, too. However, the time series V is non-stationary
for many companies and is, hence, dierentiated. Since the realized volatility moves very slowly,
it has only little impact on the rst dierence of V such that the results do not depend on the
realized volatility.
7over more than one internet page. However, the download routine recognizes this
and controls for it.
A news story consists of a headline, the full text or body, a time stamp (date and
time), keywords and a list of companies indicating for whom the news story might
be important. In the following, this list is called 'related RICs'. The assignment of
keywords and related RICs to a news story is done by Reuters. Keywords provide
a rough, standardized categorization of the news story (e.g. Major Breaking News,
Debt ratings news, Corporate Results, Mergers and Acquisitions). In a nutshell,
company news inform about rating adjustments, analyst reports and changes for
the stock price target, give summarizing gures on quarterly and annual reports
and general news (e.g. macro-economic indicators, political events, articles in the
Washington Post, New York Times, Wall Street Journal, etc.). Corrected or updated
news are not excluded to capture the information 
ow correctly. Even though the
list of company news on the homepage of Reuters is limited to ten, the number
of daily news articles per company, e.g. identied by searching for the company's
RIC in `related RICs', is not bounded in my database because there are many news
articles that mention a company or have it in the eld `related RICs' and do not
appear in the list for the company on the homepage of Reuters. For the observation
period June 01, 2007 to December 31, 2010, there are more than 350,000 unique
news stories with respect to the url. The average news article consists of 301.29
words (including numerical expressions and symbols) with a standard deviation of
239.64 words. The median of words per news article is 272 and indicates that the
distribution is skewed to the right. The 99% quantile is 961 words. On average,
a news article consists of 14.02 sentences with a standard deviation of 33.20. The
median is 11, again, indicating that the distribution of sentences per news story is
skewed to the right, and the 99% quantile is 44.
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the number of news articles per day for all
S&P500 companies jointly, for the index components of the Dow Jones Industrial
Average by January 01, 2011 and for some frequently used keywords. I have 210,495
news articles for all S&P500 companies on 1311 days. Hence, the daily, average
number of news articles for all S&P500 companies is 160.56 with a standard deviation
of 94.01. Ignoring Saturdays and Sundays, the average number of news releases per
day increases to 212.63 with standard deviation 52.94. On October 22, 2009, 354
news stories were published, this is the maximum number of news stories per day
in the observation period. There are 17,525 news stories labeled with the keywords
`Corporate Result', `Result Forecast' or `Warnings', this gives a daily average of
13.36 with a standard deviation of 20.13. The total number of news stories with
`Broker research and recommendation' is 1,867, the daily average is, hence, 1.42
and the standard deviation is 2.26. News stories on e.g. Bank of America (BAC.N),
identied by searching for `BAC.N' in `related RICs', sum up to 11,974, with a mean
of 9.13 news stories per day and standard deviation of 8.23.
Figure 1, upper plot, shows the time series of the daily number of news stories with
the keywords `Bankruptcy' or `Insolvency' (blue curve) and its 3 day moving average
(red curve). Since there are no such news stories prior to November 23, 2007, the
8plot excludes the period June 1, 2007 to November 23, 2007. The large number of
news stories in the middle of September 2008 indicates the bankruptcy of Lehman
Brothers and the peaks in 2009 and 2010 are mainly due to the sovereign debt crisis
in Europe. The lower plot shows the time series of the daily number of news stories
for the Bank of America and the corresponding 3-day moving average. This time
series starts on June 1, 2007. The time series displays a weekly cyclicality caused by
the low number of news articles during the weekend. Again, the default of Lehman
Brothers at September 15, 2008 can be clearly identied. The peak in January 2009
is caused by the arranged acquisition of Merrill Lynch by Bank of America.
[Table 1 about here.]
[Figure 1 about here.]
4.2 News Coverage
To improve the understanding of the news database, in the following I investigate
the company characteristics that expose a company to news coverage. I consider
62 large companies in the S&P500 with liquid option and CDS market. Table 9
lists these companies. The news exposure of a company is measured by its average
number of news articles per day, identied with the company's RIC in `related
RICs'. This measure is denoted Qi. Alternatively, news coverage is measured by
the number of days with at least one news story. This measure is denoted Yi.
Companies are characterized by the average market capitalization in the observation
period, CAPi, the average price-to-book ratio, P2Bi, the stock return during the
observation period, Reti, and the corresponding realized volatility, (Reti).
The average company has an average market capitalization during June 01, 2007
to December 31, 2010 of 8,3223 billions USD and an average price-to-book ratio of
2.67. The average stock market performance in this period and across companies is
-9.41% and the average stock return volatility is 42.63. I estimate an ordinary linear
regression model, i.e.
Qi =  + 1P2Bi + 2 ln(CAPi) + 3Reti + 4(Reti) + i: (2)
Table 2 shows the regression estimates for (2) and some straightforward adjustments.
a indicates signicance at the 1% condence level, b at the 5% level and c at the
10% level. Even though this analysis excludes small and mid-sized companies, the
company size is still a signicant, positive determinant of the news coverage. The
price-to-book ratio is signicant and negative in all regressions. This indicates that
companies with high ratios are less often in the news than companies with low
ratios. One reason for this pattern might be that the latter companies have a
higher potential for stock price increases. The stock return is weakly signicant and
negative. The stock return volatility is signicant, too, and positive. Both indicate
9that troubled companies are frequently in the media. However, this result might
also be due to the nancial crisis.
All results are qualitatively the same if Yi is considered instead of Qi. Hence, large
companies with low price-to-book ratios and volatile stock returns have a high media
coverage, or conversely, companies with a high media coverage are large, have a low
price-to-book ratio and their stock price is rather volatile.
[Table 2 about here.]
5 Content Analysis and Variable Construction
A company, a news article is relevant for a company if
(a) contains the company's RIC in the eld 'related RICs', or
(b) mentions the company name or its nickname in the headline and has the com-
pany's RIC in the eld `related RICs'.
Denition (a) is, of course, a broader denition than (b), and sensitive to news
regarding the whole industry or direct competitors. The term company name in
denition (b) and in the following refers to the shortest fraction of the full company
name that clearly identies the company, e.g. `Disney' instead of `Walt Disney Co' or
`Conoco' instead of `ConocoPhillips'. For most companies I am able to identify the
company's nickname very accurately. For example, Bank of America is frequently
called BofA, Johnson & Johnson is called J&J and American Express is AmEx.
Texas Instruments, often called TI, and General Electrics, shortened GE, can only
be identied with a small error rate. Filtering for related RICs in denition (b)
ensures that a news story with a headline such as 'BofA cuts Google price target' is
assigned to Google, but not to Bank of America.
Even though a news article is relevant for a company, it is unlikely that all words in
the full text are important for the company as well. Hence, I dene which passages
in the full text of a relevant news story have to be analyzed. Given a relevant news
story according to denition (a) or (b), I dene the relevant text by:
(c) All words in a sentence are relevant if the company name or nickname is men-
tioned within the same sentence, or
(d) All words with a distance of at most 5 words to the company name or nickname
are relevant.
Words that contain numerical expressions (e.g. `B787', `A330-200', `$35') are not
counted for the word distance since they are not related to the sentiment of a news
story.
10Given a company, I analyze the content of the relevant text of a relevant news story
and assign a numerical value to it. The approach relies on the `General Inquirer'
(http://www.webuse.umd.edu:9090/). The `General Inquirer' is a dictionary based
content analysis algorithm. It assigns words to word categories and reports the
number of hits in each cluster, relative to all analyzed words, see Stone et. al. (1966).
There are more than 80 word categories. However, I restrict myself to the categories
`positive', `negative', `strong' and `weak'. Even though being very popular, the
`General Inquirer' is not perfect. Many words have more than one meaning and
might be incorrectly assigned to a word category, see for example Loughran and
McDonald (2011), who test the performance of the `General Inquirer' by analyzing
annual and 10-K reports, and nd that a substantial fraction of negative words
(about 60%) is misinterpreted. However, the content of the Reuters news articles is
very general and hardly comparable to annual reports, hence I expect a low error
rate.
Consider, for example, the following news stories:
Feb. 29, 2008, Northrop-EADS beats Boeing to built U.S. tanker
WASHINGTON, Feb. 29, 2008 - The U.S. Air Force said on Friday it
had picked a transatlantic team led by Northrop Grumman, instead of
Boeing, to start building a new aerial refueling 
eet in a surprise choice
worth about $35 billion. Northrop Grumman Corp (NOC.N) and its
European partner, Airbus parent EADS (EAD.PA), "clearly provided
the best value to the government," Sue Payton, the Air Force's chief
weapons buyer, told reporters at a brieng. The contract is to supply up
to 179 tanker aircraft in a deal valued at about $35 billion over the next
15 years, the Air Force said in a statement. The aircraft will replace [...].
Sept. 29, 2009, Kenya Airways eyes Airbus A330-200s sources
NAIROBI, Sept. 29, 2009 - Kenya Airways (KQNA.NR) is in talks with
Airbus (EAD.PA) about buying several A330-200 planes after delays to
Boeing's (BA.N) much-anticipated B787 Dreamliner jet, senior ocials
at the airline said on Tuesday. The carrier's Chief Executive Ocer
Titus Naikuni said on Friday the company was in talks with Airbus [...].
Clearly, the news stories are rather positive for Northrop and EADS, respectively,
and negative for Boeing. According to the 'General Inquirer' dictionary, there are
several positive words in the second sentence of the rst news story (`clearly', `pro-
vide', `best'). There, Northrop and EADS are mentioned, but not Boeing. Re-
garding the second news story, approach (c) might fail since Airbus and Boeing are
mentioned in the same sentence. However, the ve word distance around Boing
covers the word `delay', which clearly signals negative sentiment for Boeing, but
there are no negative words within the ve word distance around EADS. Of course,
the performance of both approaches depends on the structure of the news story. If
11a news article describes complex events where many companies interact, both ap-
proaches might fail to measure the correct sentiment. However, both approaches
perform very well for simple or well structured news. Furthermore, the company
name is sometimes replaced by a synonym, e.g. `planemaker' instead of `Boeing'.
Such cases are not recognized.
To homogenize market data and news stories, I assign news stories which were
released after 4 p.m. New York time to the following trading day. News stories
published between Friday, 4 p.m. and Monday, 4 p.m. are assigned to Monday.
Assume there are Qi;t 2 N news stories for company i on day t according to denition
(a) or (b). Given the relevant text following denition (c) or (d), let Posi;t;j [Negi;t;j]
denote the number of positive [negative] words relative to the total number of words
in the relevant text of news story j = 1;:::;Qi;t. Then, the average, relative number
of positive words and the average, relative number of negative words are used to



























Pi;t and Ni;t might be interpreted as positive and negative public signals in the style
of Harris and Raviv (1993). High values of Pi;t or Ni;t indicate strong signals.
It is likely that there is a monotone relationship between the average of net sentiment
of a day, i.e. 1
Qi;t
PQi;t
j=1(Posi;t;j Negi;t;j), and the abnormal stock returns or the CDS
spread, but trading volume and volatility are presumably not monotonically related
to the net sentiment. Therefore, positive and negative signals are disentangled. I do
not exclude days without news releases since these days are important as well and
might indicate `neutral' or `calm' days. The sentiment for these days is set to zero.
Furthermore, I dene two disagreement scores. Usually, the investors' view on a
company is in
uenced, perhaps driven, by public information. If news stories dis-
agree heavily, it is likely that investors disagree as well. Hence, the degree of dier-
ence of opinion among investors might well be approximated by the variation in the







where () is the standard deviation. I set Dstd
i;t = 0 if Qi;t  1.
Inspired by Das and Chen (2007), I construct a second measure for disagreement.
Dene the auxiliary variable Ai;t;j := 1(Negi;t;j < Posi;t;j)   1(Negi;t;j > Posi;t;j).
1() is the indicator function. It is one if and only if the argument is true. Hence,
Ai;t;j = 1 if the net sentiment of news j is positive, it is zero if Posi;t;j = Negi;t;j
and  1 otherwise. A might be interpreted as a buy- or sell-signal for investors.














If all news stories on day t and for company i have a positive sentiment or all news
stories have a negative sentiment, D
pol
i;t = 1. This might indicate no disagreement.
For days without news stories (Qi;t = 0) I set D
pol
i;t = 1, too. For all other days
D
pol
i;t > 1. D
pol
i;t is high if there are many news stories with positive or negative
sentiment (numerator is large) and the number of positive and negative news sto-
ries is balanced (denominator is small). These days might be associated with high
disagreement across investors. Whereas Dpol measures the polarity of (Ai;t;j)j2Qi;t
and ignores the magnitude of the net sentiment, Dstd is sensitive to variations in




I analyze the contemporaneous relationship between sentiment respectively disagree-
ment and the nancial market. This analysis is motivated by Das, Martinez-Jeres
and Tufano (2005) and the literature on dierence of opinion. This analysis allows
to test Hypotheses 2 to 5 on the co-movement of market variables and public signals
respectively the degree of dierence of opinion. The analysis does not allow to con-
clude on market eciency and the predictability of market returns. Even though
the news stories are unscheduled, a signicant relationship between sentiment re-
spectively disagreement and market prices or returns on a daily frequency might be
consistent with ecient markets if the market anticipates the news.
According to Gro-Klumann and Hautsch (2011), the relevance of a news article
for a company determines the strength of the relationship between sentiment of the
news and the market. Hence, I apply the more restrictive denition of relevance,
i.e. denition (b), and use denition (c) to identify the relevant words. The other
denitions are used for robustness tests.
6.1.1 Company Individual Analysis
As shown in Blume, Easley and O'Hara (1994), volatility and historical stock prices
might be valuable information for future stock returns. Pan and Poteshman (2006)
document that option trading contains relevant information for stock returns, too,
13and according to Sarwar (2006) and Kyriacou and Sarno (1999), option trading vol-
ume and volatility interact. Cremers et. al. (2008) report a signicant relationship
between equity markets and credit markets. Chordia, Sarkar and Subrahmanyam
(2005) study the intertemporal association between liquidity, volatility and returns
by applying a vector autoregressive model. Also, the dierence of opinion liter-
ature implies positive autocorrelation in trading volume, negative autocorrelation
in returns and positive correlation between trading volume and volatility. To con-
trol for these associations and to determine the relationship between the nancial
market and sentiment and disagreement, respectively, accurately, I choose the most
parsimonious regression model that allow for the aforementioned pattern, a vector
autoregressive process with one lag. I estimate
h





^ "i;t 1 Ti;t 1 Vi;t 1 Oi;t 1 Ci;t 1
i0
+ i[Pi;t Ni;t Di;t]
0 + KiUt + i;t:
D stands for the disagreement score and refers to Dstd or Dpol. Frequently, the
augmented Dicky-Fuller test cannot reject the unit-root hypothesis for the CDS
spread and for the volatility spread. Hence, I replace these time series by the
rst dierence for all companies. V and C denote the rst dierence of the
volatility spread and the CDS spread, respectively. ^ "i;t, Ti;t and Oi;t are always
stationary. i is a 5  5 matrix and captures possible inter-temporal associations
between the abnormal returns, trading volume in stock and options and the change
in the volatility spread and the CDS spread, respectively. i is a 5  3 matrix
and measures the association between sentiment respectively disagreement and the
market. Ut is 5  1 vector with weekday dummies and Ki's dimension is 5  5. i;t
is white noise.
[Table 3 about here.]
[Table 4 about here.]
[Table 5 about here.]
Tables 3, 4 and 5 show the estimates for i. The companies listed in these tables
are chosen because I have a sucient number of daily observations for all time
series jointly to calculate reliable regression coecients and p-values. A list of
company names and RIC is provided in the appendix. The option data is available
for most companies since June 2008 and determine the beginning of the estimation
period, whereas the CDS spread is available until October 2010 and determine the
end. With the exception of Intel Technology (INTC.O) and Travelers Companies
(TRV.N), I have 597 days without missing observations for each company. There are
479 observations for Intel and 660 observations for Travelers. The FF residuum is
estimated in-sample using the time span June 01, 2008 to September 30, 2010. The
14average FF-R2 across all companies is about 54%, indicating that the general market
movements explain a substantial fraction of the variation in the stock returns. The
average correlation between the abnormal return and the change in the volatility
spread across all companies is -0.2859. Stock and option trading volume are on
average correlated by 0.3201 and the change in the volatility spread and the CDS
spread are on average correlated by 0.2219. All other correlations between the
market variables are close to zero. On average, positive and negative sentiment
are correlated by -0.0725, positive sentiment and Dstd are correlated by 0.2613 and
negative sentiment and Dstd by 0.1727. The average correlation between Dpol and
P respectively N is insignicantly higher.
Table 3 gives the estimated, contemporaneous relationship between positive sen-
timent and abnormal returns, stock trading volume, the change in the volatility
spread, option trading volume and the change in the CDS spread (this is the rst
column of ^ i), as well as the number of days with positive sentiment, #(P > 0), the
mean of positive sentiment, given all days with positive sentiment, m(PjP > 0), and
the standard deviation, (PjP > 0). Table 4 shows the second column of ^ i, this is
the estimated relationship between negative sentiment and the market, and the cor-
responding descriptive statistics. Table 5 shows the estimated regression coecients
of disagreement. In all tables, a indicates signicance at the 1% condence level, b
at the 5% level and c at the 10% level. I do not show the regression estimates for
i and Ki.
As can be seen in the rst column of Tables 3 and 4, positive sentiment and nega-
tive sentiment are frequently signicant for the FF residuum. Often, the coecient
of positive sentiment is positive and the coecient of negative sentiment is nega-
tive, indicating that positive news are associated with positive abnormal returns
and negative news with negative abnormal returns. This suggests that the General
Inquirer and the relevant text identication procedure approximate the `true' sen-
timent or signal accurately. Disagreement is frequently signicant, but the sign of
the signicant coecients varies among companies. There are 9 signicant, posi-
tive coecients and 10 signicant, negative coecients. Hence, it is unclear which
eect dominates on average. The average R2 across all companies with respect to
the abnormal return is 4.57%. Compared to an average R2 of 2.99% in regression
model (6) and omitting i[Pi;tNi;tDi;t], shows that positive and negative sentiment
and disagreement account on average for 1.58 percentage points in the R2. This
signicant increase by more than 50% is exclusively due to the content analysis and
highlights its accuracy. Even though the news articles are usually unscheduled and
fundamental, the signicant link between returns and news does not allow conclusion
on market eciency.
The average R2 of regression model (6) with respect to stock trading volume is
38.48% and the average R2 of (6) and without the regressors [Pi;tNi;tDi;t] is 34.92%,
indicating that the content analysis explains about 4 percentage points. Regarding
option trading volume, the average R2 increases from 15.43% without the content
analysis to 16.46%. To test Hypothesis 2, I use positive sentiment and negative
sentiment to approximate the public signal's intensity and study its association
15with trading volume on the same day. As shown in the second column of Tables
3 and 4, the estimated coecient of positive sentiment on stock trading volume
is positive and signicant for 19 out of 62 companies. The coecient of negative
sentiment is positive and signicant for 12 companies. Option trading volume shows
similar patterns, but the dependencies are less pronounced. However, the signal's
intensity seems to be positively related to trading volume, as stated in Hypothesis
2. Hypothesis 3 relates stock and option trading volume to disagreement. Table 5,
columns 2 and 4, show the estimated relationship between disagreement across news
and trading volume. High disagreement is associated with signicantly higher stock
trading volume for 49 companies out of 62. There is no company with a signicant,
negative regression coecient. Regarding the relationship between option trading
volume and disagreement, I nd 23 out of 62 positive and signicant relationships.
Hence, I have strong support for Hypotheses 3. Investors seem to trade on public
signals and the degree of disagreement accelerates the trading volume.
The relationship between the change in the volatility spread and disagreement is in-
conclusive, see Table 5, column 3. The number of signicant regression coecients
is low, and the number of signicantly negative regression coecients and signif-
icantly positive regression coecients are almost balanced. Hence, it is infeasible
to draw robust conclusions on the relationship between volatility and disagreement.
However, Table 4 indicates that the volatility spread widens subsequent to days
with negative sentiment (12 positive and signicant coecients in Table 4, column
3). This nding is consistent with evidence on negative correlation between index
returns and volatility, since days with negative sentiment are also associated with
negative abnormal returns. The average R2 of the full regression model with respect
to the change in the volatility spread is 6.80% and the contribution of the content
analysis in terms of average R2 is 1.13 percentage points. Nevertheless, Hypothesis
4 is not supported.
The change in the CDS spread is often negatively correlated with positive sentiment
and positively correlated with negative sentiment. This is consistent with the rela-
tionship between the abnormal stock returns and sentiment, and with the response
of the volatility spread. Given a negative signal, the value of equity decreases and the
equity volatility goes up. Consistent with structural models, the distance to default
is reduced and the expected default loss, measured by the CDS spread, increases. As
can be seen in Table 5, column 5, disagreement has frequently a signicant, positive
regression coecient and supports Hypothesis 5. The content analysis increases the
average R2 of the change in the CDS spread from 5.91% to 7.11%
Most results remain qualitatively unchanged if I consider Dpol as a measure of dis-
agreement instead of Dstd. Therefore, the results are not shown but only discussed
brie
y. The relationship between abnormal returns and positive sentiment becomes
slightly stronger and the coecient of disagreement is now frequently signicant,
negative for abnormal returns. This is consistent with Yu (2011), who shows that
stocks with high analyst forecast dispersion underperform relative to stocks with low
forecast dispersion. Another noteworthy change is that the CDS spread increases
with the alternative disagreement measure for many companies. This gives further
16support to Hypothesis 5.
6.1.2 Pooled Analysis
Next, I analyze all companies jointly. The purpose of this analysis is to investigate
the dominating eects between the nancial market and sentiment and disagreement,
respectively, for all companies. It simplies the interpretation of the regression
coecients. I estimate
h





s^ "i;t 1 sTi;t 1 sVi;t 1 sOi;t 1 sCi;t 1
i0
+ [sPi;t sNi;t sDi;t]
0 + KUt + i;t:
The regression coecients ,  and K are now independent of the company index
i. Hence, I make the strong assumption that the relationship between the market
variables, measured by , and between the market variables and the information
extracted from company news, measured by , is described by the same coecients
for all rms. I standardize and pool all time series (with the exception of the weekday
dummies, which are pooled without further manipulation) by subtracting the time
series' individual mean and dividing by the time series' standard deviation. The
standardized, pooled time series are marked with the prex s. As an example, the





























where m() denotes the mean, () is the standard deviation, L is the number of
companies and Gi is the number of observations for company i. Then, the estimates
in the pooled regression model are given by




[s^ " sT sV sO sC] (8)







i=1(Gi   1), 1ab is a matrix of dimension a  b with 1s everywhere
and U is the pooled matrix of weekday dummies. The square symbol in (8) refers
to each component in the vector of residuals and is not a matrix operator.
Pooling all company-specic observations gives in total 36,229 company-day obser-
vations. Table 6 shows ^ , ^  and ^ K. Disagreement is measured by Dstd in the upper
panel and by Dpol in the lower panel. The regression estimates of  and K are very
similar for Dstd and Dpol. Stock trading volume displays positive autocorrelation,
which is consistent with the models of Harris and Raviv (1993) and Banerjee and
17Kremer (2010). Furthermore, there are several pattern which are consistent with in-
formation asymmetry. Trading volume predicts abnormal stock returns, as discussed
in Blume, Easley and O'Hara (1994). Also option trading volume predicts abnormal
returns, which might be related to the results of Pan and Poteshman (2006), even
though I do not study the ratio of traded put and call options, but the sum.
[Table 6 about here.]
Abnormal stock returns, the change in the volatility spread (which is closely related
to the absolute return) and the change in the CDS spread positively predict stock
trading volume. This nding is consistent with Barber and Odean (2008), who
identify attention-grabbing stocks also with large stock price movements, and nd
that these stocks have a higher turnover volume than stocks that do not attract
attention. However, attention might also be gained by large movements in the CDS
spread and an increase in volatility. Consistent with structural models on credit
derivatives, the CDS spread increases given an increase in volatility. Surprisingly,
it also increases given a large abnormal return. This might be due to analyzing
abnormal returns instead of gross returns. The weekday dummies are frequently
signicant, indicating the presence of weekday eects.
Positive and negative sentiment are still highly signicant for abnormal returns.
Consistent with the results in the previous section, positive sentiment is positively
related to abnormal returns and negative sentiment negatively. The coecient of
Dstd is insignicant, see upper panel. This does not necessarily mean that disagree-
ment is not relevant for the abnormal return. The insignicance might be due to
the heterogeneous relationship between stock prices and disagreement among news
articles, e.g. Table 5 shows 9 signicant, positive and 10 signicant, negative re-
lationships. Hence, both eects are likely to cancel out in the pooled regression.
Furthermore, the alternative disagreement score Dpol detects a signicant, negative
relationship between abnormal returns and disagreement in the pooled analysis, see
Table 6, lower panel. Again, this is consistent with Yu (2011) and Das et. al. (2005).
The R2s in Table 6 with respect to the abnormal return are lower than the average R2
of the rm individual regressions. So, the R2 of s^ " is 0.4% and 0.51%, respectively,
whereas the average R2 of ^ "i is 4.57%. This decrease might be due to the restrictive
assumption of identical regression coecients for all companies. The contribution
of the content analysis to the R2 of s^ " is about 0.2 percentage point and doubles
the explained variation in abnormal returns.
The average R2 of stock trading volume and allowing for company individual regres-
sion coecients is 38.48% and reduces to 34.99% respectively 35.52% in the pooled
analysis. The R2 of standardized option trading volume is 10.67% and 10.97%, re-
spectively, whereas the average R2 of the company individual analysis is 16.46%.
This moderate decrease in terms of R2 might indicate that the assumption of iden-
tical regression coecients is not too restrictive for trading volume. Investors' trad-
ing behavior seems to be similarly related to information such as sentiment, lagged
18volatility, etc. for all companies. The contribution of the text analysis to the R2 is
about 3 percentage points for stock trading volume and about 0.65 percentage points
for option trading volume. In the upper panel, standardized stock and option trad-
ing volume increase with positive and negative sentiment and disagreement. The
relationship is highly signicant and consistent with the company individual anal-
ysis and Hypotheses 2 and 3. Surprisingly, negative sentiment is negatively related
to trading volume in the lower panel of Table 6. As discussed in Barber and Odean
(2008), investors might be subject to investment restrictions such as short-selling re-
strictions. Then, negative signals are only relevant for investors who already own the
stock. On the other hand, positive signals are relevant for all investors. Therefore,
negative signals might reduce trading whereas positive signals increase trading.
The volatility spread narrows with positive sentiment and it increases with negative
sentiment. However, the estimated relationship between the volatility spread and
disagreement is inconclusive. Whereas the coecient of Dstd is insignicant in the
upper panel of Table 6, the coecient of Dpol is negative and weakly signicant.
Both results are inconsistent with Hypothesis 4. Nevertheless, and consistent with
Hypothesis 5, the CDS spread increases with high disagreement. This increase is
presumably due to the decrease in the equity value, given high disagreement, and not
due to an increase in the equity volatility and asset volatility, respectively. Moreover,
the CDS spread increases with negative sentiment and, at least in the lower panel
of Table 6, decreases with positive sentiment as expected.
The regression results in this section and the previous sections show that simple mea-
sures of sentiment and disagreement based on company news articles of Reuters add
useful information to standard factors which are frequently used to explain market
activity. However, the predictive power of sentiment and disagreement is ambiguous,
even though the news articles may be fundamental news and unscheduled.
6.2 Predicting Market Activity
Now, I use the pooled regression model to study the predictive power of senti-
ment and disagreement. Hence, I do not analyze the contemporaneous relationship
between market activity and sentiment respectively disagreement, but the relation-
ship between the market and sentiment respectively disagreement from the previous
trading day. Hence, the regression model changes to
h
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Now, the residual in the objective function (8) is
h
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19Table 7 shows the regression estimates for ,  and K. The results in the upper
panel are based on the disagreement measure Dstd and the results in the lower panel
on Dpol. The estimates for  and for K are very similar to the contemporaneous
analysis. The R2s decrease compared to the contemporaneous analysis of sentiment,
disagreement and market activity. Positive sentiment is still highly signicant and
predicts positive abnormal returns on the following day. Both disagreement mea-
sures predict negative abnormal returns on the following trading day. Negative
sentiment is insignicant. This might be due to incorrect assignments of words to
the word category `negative' by the `General Inquirer', see Loughran and McDonald
(2011). However, the relationship between abnormal stock returns and sentiment
and disagreement, respectively, are still unexpected and might be inconsistent with
Hypothesis 1. Assuming ecient markets, prices should respond to new information
immediately. However, the signicance of positive sentiment and disagreement hints
towards market ineciencies even on a daily frequency. These results become even
stronger if I consider the excess stock return instead of the abnormal stock return.
Then, the R2 of the excess return is 1.16%, positive sentiment is positive, signicant
and negative sentiment and disagreement are signicant, negative. The results are
not shown.
There is no signicant relationship between the change in the CDS spread and the
one day lagged sentiment and disagreement, respectively. Hence, the credit market
seems to be ecient with respect to the information extracted from the Reuters com-
pany news and in this framework. However, the company individual analysis (the
results are not shown) indicates that negative sentiment and disagreement predict
the change in the CDS spread for several companies. The sign of the company-
individual regression coecients varies across rms and might destroy a signicant
relationship in the pooled regression model.
[Table 7 about here.]
Furthermore, positive sentiment predicts stock trading volume on the following day,
indicating that positive signals have a long-lasting impact on trading volume. How-
ever, negative sentiment is insignicant. This heterogeneity might be due to in-
vestment restrictions, see Barber and Odean (2008). Surprisingly, the regression
coecients of both disagreement measures are signicantly negative. One possible
explanation might be that investors tend to over-react to disagreement. Then, the
stock trading volume might be lower during the following days.
The volatility spread increases signicantly after negative sentiment and after dis-
agreement, measured by Dstd. Dpol is insignicant. Compared to the contem-
poraneous relationship between disagreement and the volatility spread, which is
inconclusive, the result for the one day lagged Dstd is more consistent with Hypoth-
esis 4. The delayed response of the volatility spread could be due to a rather slow
information processing and might also hint at market ineciencies. Positive and
negative sentiment and disagreement have only little predictive power for option
trading volume. These results are conrmed by the company individual analysis.
206.3 Robustness
A further extension of these simple analyses is to weight the sentiment with its degree
of uncertainty. I measure uncertainty with two approaches. (1) Uncertainty in news
articles might be measured with the `General Inquirer' word categories `strong' and
`weak'. However, there is a substantial overlap between the categories `positive' and
`strong' respectively `negative' and `weak'. This might bias the results. Nevertheless,





Wi;t;j + Zi;t;j + 2#
;
where Zi;t;j denotes the number of strong words and Wi;t;j is the number of weak
words. # is a small, positive constant that ensures the existence of Hi;t;j even though
there are neither strong nor weak words in the news story j. Then, Hi;t;j = 0:5. If
there are only strong words, Hi;t;j  1 and if there are only weak words Hi;t;j is close
to zero. (2) Alternatively, if the author of a news article uses many positive words
and negative words in the relevant text for a company, she might be unsure about







If positive and negative words are almost balanced, H
(2)
i;t;j is close to zero. If either
positive words clearly dominate negative words or negative words clearly dominate
positive words, H
(2)
i;t;j is close to 1.





the uncertainty that is related to a news article can be taken into account. The
results with respect to both measures of uncertainty stay qualitatively the same
compared to the results discussed above and, hence, are not shown.
Moreover, zooming into the news story and analyzing words within the close neigh-
borhood of the company name or nickname, as described in denition (d), gives very
similar results. The results are not shown, too, but indicate that a small fraction of
the full news text already contains valuable information for the nancial market.
7 Trading Strategies
According to the previous section, positive sentiment and disagreement are statis-
tically signicant to predict abnormal stock returns and excess returns. However,
this does not allow to conclude on the economic signicance and on market e-
ciency. Therefore, I trading strategies based on positive and negative sentiment to
gain insights on the economic signicance of news articles for the stock market.
21Assume that an investor trades in the 62 stocks simultaneously. The investor has
no initial endowment. She observes the signal
Xi;t = 1(Pi;t > Ni;t)   1(Pi;t < Ni;t):
Xi;t can take on the value +1;0 and  1. Xi;t = 1 might be interpreted as a buy-signal
and Xi;t =  1 as a sell-signal3. Xi;t = 0 might indicate a neutral position. Since
Xi;t incorporates news from 4 p.m. at t 1 to 4 p.m. at day t, trading on Xi;t might
imply a substantially delayed response to new information. Whenever Xi;t = 1, the
investor borrows one USD at the risk-free rate and purchases (a fraction of) stock i
at the closing price of day t. At the following day, the stock is sold at the closing
price of day t + 1 and the loan is repaid, if the signal changes to neutral or to sell.
Otherwise, the position is not closed until the buy-signal disappears. If Xi;t =  1,
the investor short-sells one USD in stock i, invests this one USD at the risk-free
rate Rf and holds the position until the signal changes. Prots and losses, due to
trading are collected in her money account, which is grossed up with the risk-free
rate. Furthermore, the investor has to pay transaction costs for one round-trip. For
simplicity, I assume that the risk-free rate for lending and borrowing is the same
and that the transaction costs are payed when the position is closed.
More precisely, let Mt denote the value of the money account at day t, Si;t the closing
price of stock i at day t and R
f
t is the daily gross risk-free interest rate, taken from
the data library of Kenneth French. By assumption, M0 = 0. The money account







































A1(Xi;t 1 =  1 _ Xi;t 6=  1); (13)
where (t) = maxfs < tjXi;s 1 6= 1 _ Xi;s = 1g denote the most recent `buy'-signal
and (t) = maxfs < tjXi;s 1 6=  1 _ Xi;s =  1g the most recent `sell'-signal. TC
denotes the transaction costs. The indicator function in (12) and (13) is one if and
only if a position is closed. Then, the prot is assigned to the money account.
Alternatively, I test this trading strategy against the market. This means that the
investor does not nance trades at the risk-free rate and invest at the risk free-rate
if a stock is short-sold, respectively, but at the market return. Then, Rf in (12) and
(13) is replaced by RMarket, both benchmarks are downloaded from the homepage
of Kenneth French.
3The variables X and A dier since A is dened for each news story individually whereas X
refers to the average net sentiment of a trading day.





i;t = minfXi;t;0g. Whereas X
+
i;t consists only of buy-signals, X
 
i;t
incorporates only sell-signals. I do not consider trading strategies that are based
on disagreement to avoid con
icting signals between sentiment and disagreement.
Furthermore, I do not incorporate the signal intensity, i.e. Pi;t Ni;t, nor the trading
volume in the corresponding stock, the stock volatility or the company's CDS spread.
Those trading strategies might depend on parameter values and, hence, require an
in-sample optimization and an out-of-sample performance evaluation. However, the
short time span of my data sample is insucient for this approach.
The full observation period June 01, 2007 to December 31, 2010 covers 56110
company-day observations (62 companies  905 days). Using denition (b) and
(c) to calculate Pi;t and Ni;t results in 8757 buy-signals and 3816 sell-signals. This
yields 6062 long-positions and 3042 short positions with an average duration of
1.44 days and 1.25 days, respectively. Excluding transaction costs and renancing
costs, the average gain of a long-position is 29 bps with a standard deviation of
272 bps and the average gain of a short-position is 51 bps with standard deviation
365 bps. Hence, trades on sell-signals are more protable and less frequent. The
lower number of sell-signals and their shorter duration compared to buy-signals is
somewhat surprising since the observation period covers the nancial crisis. Further-
more, transaction and nancing costs of 30 bps and more would render trading on
buy-signals, on average, non-protable. Sell-signals seem to be more robust against
transaction costs. Moreover, the prots of the daily, aggregated long and short
trades are correlated by -0.45. Therefore, the trading strategy on X
+
i;t might be an
ecient hedge for the strategy on X
 
i;t.
Table 8 shows summary statistics for the money accounts of the trading strategies




i;t and for the benchmarks risk-free rate and mar-
ket return, assuming dierent levels of transaction costs. Without transaction costs
and by benchmarking against the risk-free rate, the money account of the trading
strategy that incorporates buy- and sell-signals increases from 0 USD by June 01,
2007, to 33.32485 USD by December 31, 2010. The money account's minimum is
-0.0406 USD and it turns negative only for one day. Hence, there is almost no risk of
losing money, indicating that the strategy might be interpreted as an approximate
arbitrage opportunity. The trading strategies based on buy- respectively sell-signals
exclusively have similar gain-loss proles and might be seen as approximate arbitrage
opportunities as well. The gain-loss proles of the trading strategies are almost un-
changed if the market return is used as a benchmark. However, the short-positions
suer slightly presumably due to long-investments in the poorly performing stock
market during the nancial crisis.
By assuming 10 bps transaction costs4 per round-trip, the terminal values of the
money account of the joint trading strategy on buy- and sell-signals are 24.0594 USD
respectively 19.8684 USD, depending on the benchmark, and the gain-loss ratios
4The transaction costs might also cover the bid-ask spread and dierent rates for borrowing
and lending.
23are still very attractive and comparable to an approximate arbitrage opportunity.
The 5% quantile, q0:05(Mt), is positive for both strategies, and the money accounts
turn negative for only 3 respectively 4 days with a minimum value of -0.1286 USD
respectively -0.1429 USD. However, trading on buy-signals only, nanced at the risk-
free rate becomes quite risky compared to the scenario without transaction costs.
The 5% quantile of the money account is -0.5732 USD and the money account is
negative for 155 days. The reason might be that long-signals generate only little
prots in the nancial crisis. These prots hardly cover the transaction costs and
increase the probability that the money account turns negative. Also, trading on
sell-signals only and investing into the stock market bear some shortfall risk now.
Figure 2 depicts the value of the money accounts of the three strategies when the
risk-free rate is used as benchmark. The blue, solid curve shows the money account
of trading on Xi;t, the green, dashed curve is the money account of trading on
X
+
i;t and the red, dotted curve of X
 
i;t. The money account of Xi;t increases almost
monotonically. During the heydays of the nancial crisis (June 2007 to April 2010),
the trading strategy on buy-signals generates signicant losses, but the performance
of trades on sell-signals is excellent and compensates the losses of the buy-signals
fully. However, in spring 2009, governments and central banks successfully calmed
down the nancial markets and the stock market recovered. In the aftermath, the
trading strategy on sell-signals fails to generate prots and becomes unprotable.
At the same time, buy-signals work very well. This underlines the hedging quality
of trading on both, buy- and sell-signals, jointly. Furthermore, Figure 2 shows the
strongest decrease in the value of the money account of Xi;t (black line, 1.81 USD
in May and June 2009) and the longest waiting period to establish a new high
watermark (light blue line, 112 days during Spring and Summer 2010). Both gures
are moderate5.
Increasing the transaction costs to more than 10 bps reduces the performance of all
trading strategies and increases the likelihood of a negative money account value
signicantly. The assumption of 20 bps transaction costs per round-trip reduces
the terminal value of the money account of the joint trading strategy on buy- and
sell-signals to 14.8703 USD, including 197 days with a negative value and a mini-
mum of -1.5261 USD. This trading strategy might be still an attractive investment
opportunity, but it now bears a substantial shortfall risk. Transaction costs of 30
bps and more imply that the investor looses money on almost every buy-signal and
on many sell-signals. Hence, the terminal values of the money accounts of Xi;t and
X
+
i;t are negative. However, X
 
i;t might still be protable.
[Table 8 about here.]
[Figure 2 about here.]
5The worst case, i.e. the strongest downturn and the longest waiting period to exceed the high
watermark appear jointly at day zero, might be an indication for the minimum equity buer in
the approximate arbitrage portfolio.
248 Conclusion and Outlook
Das et. al. (2005) analyzed chat-room postings and conclude that `investors rst
trade and then talk'. I analyze company news of Reuters. These news are more
reliable than chat room postings which, at best, disseminate company news. Simple
dictionary based content analysis algorithms with rather high error rates might be
applied to measure sentiment and disagreement of those news articles. Both contain
valuable information for nancial markets.
My results are mostly consistent with models on dierence of opinion, i.e. investors
are more likely to trade stocks and options after observing public signals. Dis-
agreement across news articles is also positively correlated with stock and option
trading volume and expected stock volatility. Moreover, sentiment and disagreement
are statistically signicant to predict returns, volatility and trading volume. With
moderate transaction costs, it might be possible to exploit market ineciencies by
trading on buy- and sell-signals based on the mechanical evaluation of company
news. However, transaction costs of more than 10 bps destroy this approximate
arbitrage opportunity. Therefore, only institutional investors might be able to take
advantage of this ineciency. For transaction costs in the range of 10 bps up to 30
bps, the expected prots of the trading strategies are still positive, but the strategies
become risky, i.e. there might be a substantial probability that the terminal value
of money account is negative. Even higher transaction costs render the strategies
useless.
I consider the following extensions. (1) Classier: The 'General Inquirer' dictionary
is very general. The dictionary is not designed for analyzing nancial news. Hence,
it is likely that the results will improve signicantly if I adjust the dictionary to
account for important characteristics in nancial and economic news, which might
be misinterpreted right now. Furthermore, it might be interesting to determine
the sentiment / disagreement by applying dierent methods that are not based on
a dictionary approach. Bayesian classiers, adjective-adverb classiers and vector
distance classiers could be used as well. The grammar, text lengths or readability
might be incorporated to evaluate the sentiment. (2) Industry Portfolios: Compa-
nies within the same industry might have a similar exposures to news. Hence, by
studying industry portfolios instead of all companies separately or the overall pooled
sample, the results might become even stronger. Furthermore, it might be possible
to compare information processing among industries.
Appendix
[Table 9 about here.]
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28Figure 1: The upper gure shows the daily number of news stories with keywords
`Bankruptcy' or `Insolvency' (blue curve) and the 3 day moving average (red curve),
starting in June 01, 2007 to December 31, 2010. The lower gure shows the daily
number of news stories for the Bank of America.
29Figure 2: The gure shows the value of the money accounts of trading on buy- and
sell-signals (blue, solid curve), buy-signals (green, dashed curve) and sell-signals
(red, dotted curve), assuming 10 bps transaction costs per round-trip and the risk-
free interest rate as benchmark. For the trading strategy on buy- and sell-signals,
the black line marks the strongest downturn, realized in May and June 2009, and the
light blue line marks the longest waiting period to establish a new high watermark,
observed in Summer 2010.
30Summary statistics for Reuters news Sum Mean Std. Max.
All 210495 160.56 94.01 354
All w/o Saturdays / Sundays 199238 220.64 52.91 354
Economic news / Macroeconomics 56531 43.12 38.61 196
General News 28085 21.42 21.00 118
Debt ratings / Credit Market News 2461 1.88 2.65 22
Society / Science / Nature 2426 1.85 4.17 30
Major Breaking News 5042 3.85 9.82 65
Bankruptcy / Insolvency 671 0.51 1.21 11
Broker Research and Recommendation 1867 1.42 2.26 17
Corporate Results / Results Forecasts / Warnings 17525 13.37 20.13 150
Mergers / Acquisitions / Takeovers 13598 10.37 11.47 60
AA.N 2770 2.11 4.16 49
AXP.N 2341 1.79 3.55 40
BA.N 4163 3.18 3.65 21
BAC.N 11974 9.13 8.23 77
CAT.N 2442 1.86 3.65 50
CSCO.O 3085 2.35 3.83 35
CVX.N 5687 4.34 3.67 29
DD.N 980 0.75 1.86 22
DIS.N 5326 4.06 3.86 26
GE.N 10236 7.81 5.98 42
HD.N 1546 1.18 2.99 34
HPQ.N 4593 3.50 4.31 31
IBM.N 4790 3.65 4.64 40
INTC.O 5219 3.98 5.26 40
JNJ.N 2860 2.18 3.01 29
JPM.N 11723 8.94 7.62 45
KFT.N 2171 1.66 3.43 35
KO.N 2080 1.59 2.54 18
MCD.N 2120 1.62 3.02 38
MMM.N 1043 0.80 2.32 28
MRK.N 3223 2.46 3.40 41
MSFT.O 10495 8.01 7.21 68
PG.N 2096 1.60 2.86 42
PFE.N 3803 2.90 3.61 52
T.N 4559 3.47 3.95 33
TRV.N 407 0.31 1.22 19
UTX.N 2026 1.55 2.59 20
VZ.N 3435 2.62 3.32 28
WMT.N 6676 5.09 5.19 45
XOM.N 8096 6.18 4.98 33
Table 1: This table gives summary statistics (sum, mean, standard deviation and
maximum) for the number of news articles per day. The upper panel classies news
on the S&P500 companies by keywords and the lower panel show the statistics for all
members of the Dow Jones Industrial Average separately. A news story is considered
as relevant for a company if the company's RIC is mentioned in the eld `related
RICs'.
31Qi Yi
constant  20.8872a  23.0588a  2.0450a  2.0569a
P2B  0.3051a  0.2101a  0.0251a  0.0225a
ln(CAP) 2.2701a 2.3374a 0.2481a 0.2501a
Ret -  1.9734b -  0.1547b
(Ret) - 6.9538a - 0.2916b
R2 38.73% 68.26% 54.58% 65.89%
# Obs. 61 61 61 61
Table 2:
The table shows the regression estimates for model (2). The subscript a, b and c indicate
signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% condence level. Qi denotes the average number of
news per day of company i, and Yi is the average number of days with at least on news
story. A news story is relevant for a company if the company's RIC is mentioned in the
eld `related RICs'.
32Optimism ^ " T V O C #(P > 0) m(PjP > 0) (PjP > 0)
AA.N 0.0017b 0.0182  0.0002 0.0343b  0.0609 79.0 3.2504 2.4254
ABT.N 0.0007 0.0249b 0.0007 0.0046  0.0322 64.0 2.9495 1.9430
AIG.N  0.0002 0.0011 0.0001  0.0107  0.3763 173.0 3.6032 2.3316
AMGN.O  0.0001 0.0125 0.0003 0.0773a  0.0121 60.0 2.4562 1.4674
APC.N 0.0002 0.0164  0.0004  0.0057  0.2079 56.0 4.2889 2.6812
AXP.N  0.0002 0.0011 0.0001 0.0285a  0.4751 64.0 3.8703 4.7347
BA.N 0.0002  0.0057 0.0004 0.0087  0.1926 172.0 2.3197 1.7603
BAC.N  0.0007 0.0104 0.0003  0.0031 0.0503 229.0 2.6885 2.0884
BAX.N 0.0004 0.0296  0.0010  0.0017  0.0543 27.0 3.1350 2.3361
BMY .N 0.0010b 0.0273c  0.0009 0.0177  0.0914c 68.0 3.5177 2.1955
BSX.N 0.0017  0.0332  0.0001  0.0070  0.1993 28.0 2.4508 1.9893
C.N  0.0003 0.0132  0.0038c 0.0059  0.5522 302.0 3.1279 2.0583
CAT.N 0.0031a 0.0587a  0.0008 0.0223  0.6997b 52.0 3.0266 1.8953
COP.N 0.0004  0.0024  0.0002 0.0037  0.1246 130.0 2.9440 1.5714
CSC.N  0.0009 0.0238  0.0010 0.0358  0.0119 7.0 5.2307 3.1978
CSCO.O 0.0004  0.0006 0.0002  0.0071  0.1287c 120.0 3.6380 2.6329
CV X.N  0.0006c 0.0031  0.0002  0.0244 0.0150 136.0 2.7571 2.0611
DD.N 0.0001  0.0094  0.0007  0.0253  0.0287 42.0 3.4745 2.2462
DELL.O 0.0006 0.0122 0.0006 0.0468b 0.0704 99.0 2.7777 2.1504
DIS.N  0.0002  0.0023 0.0009 0.0082  0.0449 123.0 3.1999 2.1781
DOW.N 0.0010 0.0029 0.0011 0.0137  0.5548 28.0 4.2514 2.3947
DV N.N 0.0005 0.0191 0.0008  0.0012  0.1463 32.0 3.4291 2.1876
F.N 0.0008 0.0268b  0.0022  0.0008 1.1325 198.0 3.0296 2.2643
FDX.N 0.0040a 0.0758a  0.0001 0.1048a  0.5887b 40.0 2.7887 2.2183
GE.N  0.0008 0.0266c 0.0033a 0.0092 0.7432 59.0 3.8617 2.7574
GLW.N 0.0018b 0.0226c  0.0008 0.0625b  0.5179 19.0 5.2515 3.9589
GR.N  0.0015a 0.1334a  0.0012 0.0872c  0.2023b 20.0 4.7729 5.7485
GS.N 0.0003  0.0049  0.0003  0.0003  0.3873 235.0 2.9275 2.1619
HON.N 0.0000 0.0282b 0.0014 0.0273  0.0772 45.0 3.3022 2.1268
HPQ.N 0.0010b 0.0023 0.0012c 0.0029 0.2170a 119.0 3.0873 2.2698
IBM.N 0.0002 0.0023  0.0004 0.0024 0.0542 138.0 3.6778 2.9647
INTC.O 0.0001  0.0014 0.0003  0.0013  0.0736 112.0 2.9896 2.2001
JNJ.N 0.0000 0.0196b 0.0009c  0.0046  0.0076 102.0 3.1333 2.6229
JPM.N 0.0010c 0.0041  0.0001 0.0002 0.1774 183.0 2.7744 2.2258
KFT.N 0.0004 0.0223  0.0002  0.0271 0.0710 94.0 2.6039 1.6123
KO.N 0.0009c 0.0328b  0.0001 0.0166  0.0389 50.0 3.3672 2.3124
MCD.N 0.0010b 0.0310b  0.0006 0.0001  0.0065 70.0 3.4556 2.3593
MDT.N 0.0003  0.0236 0.0000  0.0129 0.0866 38.0 3.5020 2.7540
MO.N 0.0002 0.0080  0.0022a 0.0058  0.1456 27.0 2.9978 2.6200
MON.N 0.0010c  0.0034 0.0006 0.0109 0.0525 65.0 3.9448 3.6470
MMM.N 0.0022a 0.0532a  0.0010 0.0687  0.0954 27.0 3.5051 2.1892
MRK.N 0.0001 0.0282a  0.0003  0.0122 0.0518 99.0 3.4270 2.6114
MS.N 0.0008 0.0167  0.0036c 0.0259c 0.7892 201.0 2.8148 2.1083
MSFT.O 0.0005 0.0056 0.0003 0.0038  0.0363 226.0 2.6009 1.6957
LLY .N  0.0013b 0.0223 0.0005  0.0185 0.0591 56.0 2.9219 1.7841
LMT.N 0.0002 0.0122  0.0008c 0.0413c 0.0365 105.0 3.5112 2.4568
ORCL.O 0.0006 0.0599a  0.0010 0.0971a  0.0725 70.0 2.8478 2.2948
OXY .N  0.0002 0.0172  0.0006 0.0324b 0.2416b 23.0 4.5061 3.3075
PFE.N 0.0002  0.0021 0.0036  0.0088 0.0384 122.0 3.0920 2.3710
PG.N 0.0001 0.0289c  0.0016  0.0161 0.0033 52.0 2.5772 1.7435
SLB.N  0.0018b 0.0143  0.0018 0.0229 0.1169 34.0 3.2163 2.5419
T.N 0.0003 0.0104 0.0003 0.0066 0.0119 102.0 3.0401 1.8108
TRV .N 0.0105a 0.1612b  0.0140c 0.1683 0.1582 9.0 1.8596 0.9999
TWX.N 0.0000 0.0091 0.0010 0.0239  0.0975 75.0 3.0055 2.1811
TXN.N 0.0006 0.0124 0.0003 0.0119 0.0478 21.0 5.6115 4.4692
UTX.N 0.0021a 0.0053  0.0018  0.0035  0.2170 8.0 5.0200 3.0939
V Z.N 0.0004  0.0003 0.0003 0.0057 0.1712 121.0 2.8905 2.0383
WFC.N 0.0011 0.0387b  0.0066c 0.0086  0.2366 84.0 3.4648 2.4066
WMT.N 0.0003 0.0094  0.0003  0.0408  0.0443 180.0 2.7180 2.0239
WLP.N  0.0011 0.0387b  0.0003 0.0257 0.4564b 36.0 3.7594 2.3134
XOM.N  0.0002 0.0006  0.0001  0.0216  0.0209 160.0 3.2283 2.1963
Pos. & sig. 13 19 3 11 3
Neg. & sig. 4 0 6 0 5
Table 3: The table shows the estimated, company-individual co-movement of posi-
tive sentiment Pi;t 1 and abnormal returns (^ "), stock trading volume (T), the rst
dierence of the volatility spread (V ), cumulated option trading volume (O) and
the rst dierence of the CDS spread (C), according to regression model (6). The
subscript a, b and c indicate signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% condence level.
Column 7, 8 and 9 show the number of days with positive sentiment, the conditional
mean of positive sentiment and its standard deviation.
33Pessimism ^ " T V O C #(N > 0) m(NjN > 0) (NjN > 0)
AA.N  0.0035a  0.0356c 0.0088a  0.0501c 2.9180a 48.0 2.7442 2.0826
ABT.N 0.0001  0.0258  0.0010 0.0271  0.0018 20.0 2.3062 1.1289
AIG.N  0.0008  0.0327c  0.0048 0.0035  0.0403 136.0 3.9970 3.0133
AMGN.O  0.0007 0.1162a 0.0048a 0.1479a 0.3611c 27.0 1.9520 1.8325
APC.N  0.0030b 0.0184 0.0050a 0.0395b 3.0280a 25.0 3.7985 2.7814
AXP.N  0.0001 0.0115 0.0022 0.0160 2.1222a 65.0 3.1979 2.4588
BA.N  0.0001 0.0162  0.0004  0.0045  0.1733 138.0 2.4733 2.0844
BAC.N  0.0010 0.0154  0.0026 0.0108 0.0427 107.0 2.4113 2.1768
BAX.N  0.0240a 1.2724a 0.0108b 0.2341 0.0491 6.0 1.3261 1.0626
BMY .N 0.0012 0.0125  0.0025c  0.0037 0.0375 20.0 2.0438 1.6211
BSX.N  0.0039 0.7366a  0.0073 0.0303 0.8928 17.0 1.3504 0.9238
C.N  0.0015  0.0022 0.0010  0.0014  1.4546 99.0 1.9581 1.6824
CAT.N  0.0011  0.0276  0.0009  0.0301  0.6743 16.0 1.7822 1.3524
COP.N  0.0002 0.0016 0.0004 0.0067  0.1752c 84.0 2.8550 2.0177
CSC.N 0.0091a 0.1801b  0.0080c  0.0537  0.7654 2.0 2.8250 2.5809
CSCO.O  0.0010 0.0783a  0.0034 0.0588c  0.1064 19.0 2.0095 1.6628
CV X.N  0.0000 0.0117  0.0002  0.0156 0.0176 94.0 3.0215 1.9161
DD.N  0.0008 0.0323c  0.0015  0.0388 1.8261a 23.0 2.8427 1.9362
DELL.O  0.0045a 0.0706a 0.0008 0.0472 0.5376c 42.0 1.8228 1.7795
DIS.N  0.0024b  0.0076 0.0040 0.0174 0.1655 31.0 1.9420 1.3118
DOW.N 0.0000  0.0144  0.0001  0.0133  0.0967 31.0 3.9294 2.7804
DV N.N  0.0088a 0.0188 0.0220a 0.0137  0.6530 8.0 1.8642 1.5859
F.N  0.0020  0.0082 0.0017  0.0090 11.9571 88.0 2.4773 2.0080
FDX.N 0.0005  0.0053  0.0001  0.0261 0.1863 30.0 3.2106 3.6588
GE.N 0.0007 0.0529b 0.0000 0.0107 0.9876 37.0 3.0648 1.9041
GLW.N  0.0073a 0.2269a 0.0026 0.0348 0.6894 15.0 2.6617 3.9609
GR.N 0.0159c  0.0328  0.0025 1.4221c 0.0063 2.0 1.4533 0.5704
GS.N  0.0019b 0.0480b 0.0034b 0.0338c 0.1399 116.0 2.3064 1.9284
HON.N 0.0005 0.0029  0.0033  0.0353  0.4228 9.0 2.5706 1.5175
HPQ.N  0.0022a 0.0652a 0.0012 0.0419c 0.3178b 52.0 2.1668 1.8391
IBM.N  0.0003 0.0054 0.0014c 0.0092 0.1860 37.0 2.7328 2.5395
INTC.O  0.0012  0.0199 0.0021  0.0652  0.7197a 48.0 2.2750 1.5690
JNJ.N  0.0001 0.0025 0.0000  0.0145 0.0012 46.0 2.8465 2.7153
JPM.N 0.0003 0.0017 0.0032b 0.0040 0.1679 106.0 2.9178 2.6319
KFT.N  0.0019c 0.0219  0.0005 0.1888  0.1957 14.0 2.4609 1.9463
KO.N 0.0001 0.0169 0.0005  0.0139 0.0210 20.0 5.2119 4.8020
MCD.N 0.0006 0.0104 0.0005 0.0140 0.0247 31.0 2.0148 1.5340
MDT.N  0.0019 0.1235a 0.0051b 0.0897 0.4595 21.0 1.6765 1.1224
MO.N 0.0026  0.0224  0.0024  0.0074  0.0677 6.0 1.0153 1.2205
MON.N  0.0003  0.0204 0.0006  0.0103  0.0741 30.0 2.3710 2.2904
MMM.N 0.0019  0.0005 0.0050  0.0135  0.3744 5.0 2.2973 0.9381
MRK.N  0.0023a 0.0267 0.0003 0.0119 0.1090 48.0 2.3156 1.9083
MS.N  0.0028c 0.0269 0.0043  0.0106 9.7139 75.0 2.4378 1.9433
MSFT.O  0.0004 0.0088  0.0009  0.0615c 0.0550 72.0 1.8498 1.4563
LLY .N  0.0003 0.0022 0.0002  0.0225  0.0258 25.0 3.2295 2.9857
LMT.N 0.0013  0.0065 0.0005  0.0117  0.0058 44.0 2.1761 1.8434
ORCL.O  0.0001 0.0128 0.0001 0.0119 0.0585 51.0 2.9248 2.5158
OXY .N  0.0019  0.0035  0.0135 0.2157  0.7786 2.0 1.3525 0.6824
PFE.N  0.0007 0.0185 0.0015  0.0478 0.0943 62.0 2.3397 1.5395
PG.N 0.0002  0.0186  0.0023c  0.1008c 0.0270 48.0 2.2890 1.4934
SLB.N  0.0026  0.0102 0.0084a 0.0284 0.5508b 12.0 2.5346 1.9957
T.N  0.0002 0.0007  0.0010  0.0013  0.1212 36.0 2.0412 1.8221
TRV .N 0.0075a 0.0632  0.0072 0.0580 0.3904 8.0 3.3083 2.2270
TWX.N  0.0010 0.0136  0.0006  0.0571 0.0371 21.0 1.8660 2.7775
TXN.N 0.0028 0.0238 0.0011  0.0238 4.5247a 5.0 2.4740 1.1307
UTX.N  0.0019 0.0468  0.0006  0.0560 0.1638 7.0 3.9548 0.7271
V Z.N  0.0021 0.0348 0.0045 0.0133  0.3960 26.0 1.5650 0.8817
WFC.N  0.0033b 0.0730b 0.0019 0.0207 0.1401 54.0 2.3091 1.6347
WMT.N  0.0012b 0.0121 0.0016b  0.0899 0.0103 62.0 2.6808 2.1770
WLP.N  0.0001 0.0251  0.0008  0.0011  1.2920 9.0 1.3725 1.2788
XOM.N  0.0002  0.0002  0.0003 0.0032 0.0288 89.0 2.6779 1.9955
Pos. & sig. 3 12 11 6 9
Neg. & sig. 14 2 3 2 2
Table 4: The table shows the estimated, company-individual co-movement of nega-
tive sentiment Pi;t 1 and abnormal returns (^ "), stock trading volume (T), the rst
dierence of the volatility spread (V ), cumulated option trading volume (O) and
the rst dierence of the CDS spread (C), according to regression model (6). The
subscript a, b and c indicate signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% condence level.
Column 7, 8 and 9 show the number of days with negative sentiment, the conditional
mean of negative sentiment and its standard deviation.
34Disagreement ^ " T V O C #(D > 0) m(DjD > 0) (DjD > 0)
AA.N  0.0001 0.1077a  0.0028 0.0469c  0.5025 54.0 2.4188 2.2592
ABT.N  0.0022b 0.0682b  0.0005 0.0195 0.1882 31.0 1.6257 1.6121
AIG.N 0.0017 0.0653a 0.0029 0.0437b  2.3837 209.0 3.2710 2.1547
AMGN.O 0.0085a 0.2571a  0.0051a 0.1350a  0.6805a 33.0 1.7816 1.6824
APC.N 0.0027 0.1083a  0.0009 0.0215  0.3629 32.0 1.8993 1.7249
AXP.N  0.0004 0.0749a  0.0019 0.0277c  1.0286 54.0 2.7427 2.8239
BA.N  0.0018a 0.0514a 0.0013b 0.0091 0.2428 202.0 2.0917 1.7702
BAC.N 0.0000 0.0628a 0.0028 0.0367a  0.2434 216.0 2.2327 1.9952
BAX.N  0.0024c 0.3327a  0.0022 0.2572a  0.0154 13.0 2.8396 2.5411
BMY .N 0.0002 0.0427  0.0006 0.0091 0.0492 43.0 1.7008 1.7800
BSX.N  0.0124a 0.3925a 0.0169a 0.0894 3.3971a 19.0 1.9882 2.4059
C.N 0.0003 0.0515a 0.0021 0.0234b 0.5848 276.0 2.2967 1.6895
CAT.N 0.0002 0.1059a  0.0024 0.0315  0.4019 27.0 2.1223 2.3512
COP.N  0.0004 0.0207c 0.0016 0.0008 0.2143c 103.0 2.3616 1.5052
CSC.N 0.0128b 0.3420b 0.0217a  0.4354 7.2457a 2.0 1.8420 0.9650
CSCO.O  0.0013b 0.0349b 0.0001 0.0169  0.0436 73.0 1.7396 2.1665
CV X.N 0.0008c 0.0021 0.0002 0.0041 0.1201 133.0 2.1836 1.8328
DD.N 0.0007 0.1190a 0.0026  0.0062  0.4010 21.0 1.1783 1.1597
DELL.O  0.0021 0.0898a 0.0013 0.1456a 0.2407 78.0 1.3372 1.3688
DIS.N 0.0017b 0.0797a  0.0068 0.0144  0.3150c 86.0 1.3702 1.4605
DOW.N 0.0002 0.2729a 0.0011 0.1078a 0.7003 29.0 3.1736 2.5388
DV N.N 0.0061a 0.0848a  0.0015 0.1263a  0.0593 20.0 2.4095 2.5574
F.N  0.0001 0.0440b 0.0028 0.0411a  10.0795 177.0 1.6024 1.5340
FDX.N  0.0029b 0.2532a  0.0009 0.0986a 0.9380a 31.0 2.4819 2.4811
GE.N 0.0021c 0.0072  0.0058b 0.0584  1.1426 42.0 2.3322 1.9647
GLW.N  0.0017 0.0610a  0.0006  0.0232 0.3987 17.0 3.2953 3.3540
GR.N 0.0096a 0.3587a  0.0019 0.4344c 0.3461 8.0 1.8870 1.7545
GS.N 0.0006 0.0229 0.0008 0.0098 1.0095c 207.0 2.1838 1.7548
HON.N 0.0001 0.0832b  0.0046c  0.0144 0.2443 27.0 1.2727 1.2025
HPQ.N  0.0002 0.0813a  0.0025b 0.0591a 0.1156 88.0 2.1268 1.8925
IBM.N 0.0002 0.0592a  0.0009 0.0982a  0.0697 111.0 1.6985 2.2262
INTC.O 0.0007 0.0745a  0.0015 0.0864b 0.2383c 94.0 1.8811 1.9041
JNJ.N  0.0006 0.0272c  0.0003 0.0177 0.0037 72.0 2.1668 1.9909
JPM.N  0.0010c 0.0080  0.0025  0.0056  0.2332 162.0 2.4532 2.5032
KFT.N  0.0013 0.0557 0.0003  0.5110  0.0836 82.0 1.3556 1.1954
KO.N 0.0007 0.0599a  0.0022b 0.0502 0.1193 23.0 3.1491 2.7196
MCD.N 0.0006 0.0846a 0.0008 0.0246 0.0502 53.0 1.8974 1.3850
MDT.N  0.0045a 0.2090a 0.0001 0.0732  0.2749 32.0 1.7002 1.7557
MO.N  0.0033c 0.1571a 0.0023 0.0858 0.8789 13.0 1.7484 0.9833
MON.N  0.0003 0.0819a  0.0006 0.0666a 0.1395 35.0 2.3683 3.0473
MMM.N  0.0020 0.1856a  0.0028 0.3179c 0.6947c 12.0 1.4302 1.3572
MRK.N 0.0009 0.0479b 0.0019c 0.0110 0.0390 69.0 2.2193 1.8914
MS.N  0.0009 0.0284 0.0037  0.0044  1.4121 151.0 2.1024 1.8497
MSFT.O  0.0004 0.0423a  0.0013 0.0135  0.0051 212.0 1.8450 1.5528
LLY .N  0.0008 0.0413b 0.0017  0.0208 0.2304b 33.0 2.3060 1.8998
LMT.N  0.0016 0.0861a  0.0010 0.0193 0.0244 55.0 1.6729 1.3771
ORCL.O 0.0009 0.0151 0.0012 0.0388  0.0426 65.0 2.2632 2.4857
OXY .N 0.0022 0.0646 0.0012 0.1249b  0.2937 7.0 2.1770 1.7105
PFE.N  0.0009 0.0358a 0.0038 0.0817 0.3807a 87.0 1.9404 1.7370
PG.N  0.0011 0.0588b 0.0007 0.1997a  0.1966 49.0 1.8380 1.7458
SLB.N 0.0064a 0.0920b  0.0071b 0.0708c  0.8166a 22.0 1.7485 1.7624
T.N  0.0000 0.0526a  0.0019 0.0084 0.5071b 77.0 1.2798 1.3578
TRV .N  0.0081a 0.0590 0.0027  0.0531  0.7709 8.0 2.2566 2.0838
TWX.N  0.0016 0.0070  0.0008  0.0466  0.1464 59.0 1.1914 1.5567
TXN.N  0.0026 0.2319a  0.0001 0.2729a  0.1736 15.0 2.6765 1.2774
UTX.N 0.0052  0.0015  0.0026 0.1113  0.5210 3.0 1.4775 1.5095
V Z.N 0.0019b 0.0550a 0.0006 0.0204  0.0501 76.0 1.4279 1.4429
WFC.N 0.0019 0.1155a 0.0016 0.0590c 0.0182 62.0 1.6387 1.5371
WMT.N 0.0007 0.0763a  0.0014c 0.3018a 0.0805 137.0 1.7030 1.5085
WLP.N 0.0023 0.1351a  0.0017  0.0064 1.1201c 18.0 1.7603 1.6106
XOM.N  0.0007 0.0050 0.0000 0.0645 0.0096 149.0 2.0730 1.6049
Pos. & sig. 9 49 4 23 11
Neg. & sig. 10 0 7 0 3
Table 5: The table shows the estimated, company-individual co-movement of dis-
agreement, measured by Dstd, and abnormal returns (^ "), stock trading volume (T),
the rst dierence of the volatility spread (V ), cumulated option trading volume
(O) and the rst dierence of the CDS spread (C), according to regression model
(6). The subscript a, b and c indicate signicance at the 1%, 5% and 10% con-
dence level. Column 7, 8 and 9 show the number of days with disagreement, the
conditional mean of disagreement and its standard deviation.
35Pooled Analysis s^ " sT sV sO sC
s^ " 1  0.0010 0.0088b  0.0034 0.0063 0.0151a
sT 1 0.0221a 0.5380a  0.0528a 0.0854a  0.0049
sV 1 0.0349a 0.0734a  0.1591a 0.0184a 0.1232a
sO 1  0.0190a 0.0262a 0.0037 0.2701a  0.0163a
sC 1  0.0082 0.0274a 0.0035  0.0018 0.0876a
sP 0.0273a 0.0455a  0.0111a 0.0237a  0.0069
sN  0.0321a 0.0374a 0.0128a 0.0088c 0.0194a
sDstd 0.0008 0.1187a  0.0058 0.0599a 0.0142a
Monday 0.0493a  0.2202a 0.1149a  0.0089  0.1259a
Tuesday 0.0349b 0.0616a  0.0621a 0.0489a  0.1059a
Wednesday  0.0085  0.0541a 0.0538a  0.0091  0.0880a
Thursday 0.0203 0.0095 0.1196a 0.0184  0.0408b
Constant  0.0199 0.0387a  0.0445a  0.0097 0.0713a
R2 0.0041 0.3499 0.0340 0.1067 0.0297
s^ " 1  0.0017 0.0103b  0.0033 0.0063 0.0159a
sT 1 0.0237a 0.5345a  0.0522a 0.0849a  0.0043
sV 1 0.0353a 0.0731a  0.1605a 0.0175a 0.1220a
sO 1  0.0169a 0.0228a 0.0044 0.2683a  0.0159a
sC 1  0.0077 0.0250a 0.0046  0.0034 0.0870a
sP 0.0429a 0.0124a  0.007 0.0016  0.0125b
sN  0.0146b  0.0137a 0.0176a  0.0230a 0.0115b
sDpol  0.0388a 0.1650a  0.0131b 0.0969a 0.0237a
Monday 0.0472a  0.2201a 0.1138a  0.0120  0.1259a
Tuesday 0.0359b 0.0568a  0.0616a 0.0454a  0.1043a
Wednesday  0.0058  0.0561a 0.0528a  0.0119  0.0893a
Thursday 0.0206 0.0091 0.1199a 0.0170  0.0416b
Constant  0.0194 0.0402a  0.0443a  0.0076 0.0716a
R2 0.0051 0.3552 0.0341 0.1097 0.0299
#Obs. 36229 36229 36229 36229 36229
Table 6: The table shows the regression estimates for ,  and K in the pooled
regression model with contemporaneous relationships between the market variables
and sentiment and disagreement, respectively, i.e. (7). The upper panel measures
disagreement with Dstd and the lower panel with sDpol. a denotes signicance at
the 1% condence level, b at the 5% condence level and c at the 10% level.
36Pooled Analysis s^ " sT sV sO sC
s^ " 1  0.0005 0.0079c  0.0028 0.0054 0.0155a
sT 1 0.0239a 0.5475a  0.0548a 0.0910a  0.0044
sV 1 0.0347a 0.0751a  0.1605a 0.0187a 0.1224a
sO 1  0.0182a 0.0350a 0.0033 0.2749a  0.0147a
sC 1  0.0081 0.0272a 0.0041  0.0022 0.0871a
sP 1 0.0105a 0.0093b  0.0058 0.0043  0.0011
sN 1  0.0042  0.0027 0.0149a 0.0070 0.0074
sDstd
 1  0.0163a  0.0248a 0.0097c  0.0104a 0.0071
Monday 0.0501a  0.2338a 0.1152a  0.0190  0.1275a
Tuesday 0.0342b 0.0687a  0.0615a 0.0524a  0.1021a
Wednesday  0.0064  0.0366a 0.0513a  0.0013  0.0874a
Thursday 0.0200 0.0248c 0.1189a 0.0252  0.0401b
Constant  0.0196 0.0331a  0.0440a  0.0116 0.0707a
R2 0.0025 0.3291 0.0340 0.1018 0.0291
s^ " 1  0.0010 0.0069  0.0026 0.0052 0.0154a
sT 1 0.0242a 0.5487a  0.0544a 0.0906a  0.0033
sV 1 0.0345a 0.0746a  0.1605a 0.0187a 0.1222a
sO 1  0.0179a 0.0356a 0.0033 0.2749a  0.0144a
sC 1  0.0080 0.0275a 0.0041  0.0022 0.0872a
sP 1 0.0131b 0.0151a  0.0055 0.0042 0.0015
sN 1 0.0007 0.0067 0.0142b 0.0082 0.0096
sD
pol
 1  0.0179a  0.0319a 0.0058  0.0069  0.0020
Monday 0.0500  0.2342a 0.1150a  0.0188  0.1279a
Tuesday 0.0337b 0.0676a  0.0616a 0.0524  0.1026a
Wednesday  0.0064  0.0367a 0.0513a  0.0012  0.0874a
Thursday 0.0201 0.0251b 0.1189a 0.0252  0.0399a
Constant  0.0193 0.0334a  0.0440a  0.0116 0.0708a
R2 0.0025 0.3292 0.0340 0.1017 0.0291
#Obs. 36229 36229 36229 36229 36229
Table 7: The table shows the regression estimates for ,  and K in the pooled
regression model without contemporaneous relationships, i.e. (9). The upper panel
measures disagreement with Dstd and the lower panel with sDpol. a denotes signif-
icance at the 1% condence level, b at the 5% condence level and c at the 10%
level.
37Risk-free rate Market rate










MT 33.2485 17.7226 15.5405 29.0575 15.4238 13.6477
maxt2[0;T]fMtg 33.3755 17.7738 16.3134 29.1761 15.6800 13.7278
mint2[0;T]fMtg -0.0406 -0.1168 -0.0917 -0.0549 0.0000 -0.2398
q0:05(Mt) 0.8345 0.4743 0.2734 1.1774 1.0912 0.0000 P
t 1(Mt < 0) 1 1 12 1 0 43
10 bps
MT 24.0594 11.6034 12.4646 19.8684 9.3046 10.5718
maxt2[0;T]fMtg 24.2044 11.6657 14.7080 20.2108 10.5371 10.6630
mint2[0;T]fMtg -0.1286 -2.2423 -0.1940 -0.1429 -0.0399 -0.3421
q0:05(Mt) 0.2535 -0.5732 0.0557 0.3913 0.4594 -0.1355 P
t 1(Mt < 0) 3 155 22 4 1 134
20 bps
MT 14.8703 5.4843 9.3888 10.6793 3.1855 7.4959
maxt2[0;T]fMtg 15.3437 5.0716 13.1026 14.0891 6.6094 8.6155
mint2[0;T]fMtg -1.5261 -4.8499 -0.3238 -1.6210 -0.9771 -0.6888
q0:05(Mt) -0.9640 -3.0753 -0.1363 -0.8408 -0.3894 -0.4805 P
t 1(Mt < 0) 197 413 82 156 116 212
30 bps
MT 5.6812 -0.6349 6.3129 1.4902 -2.9337 4.4201
maxt2[0;T]fMtg 8.954 1.1072 11.4972 9.1693 3.2732 7.0032
mint2[0;T]fMtg -3.4651 -7.6135 -0.6654 -3.5721 -3.1743 -1.2930
q0:05(Mt) -2.6450 -5.7681 -0.3723 -2.4114 -2.7774 -0.9527 P
t 1(Mt < 0) 321 687 176 311 510 285
(Mt) 0.1667 0.1819 0.1224 0.1774 0.2018 0.1340
Number of trades 9104 6062 3042 9104 6062 3042
Average duration 1.39 days 1.46 days 1.26 days 1.39 days 1.46 days 1.26 days
Table 8: The table shows the terminal value, the maximum and the minimum value,
the 5% quantile and the number of days with a negative value of the money account
for trading strategies on company signals and dierent levels of transaction costs.
Xi;t incorporates of buy- and sell-signals, X
+
i;t only buy-signals and X
 
i;t only sell-
signals. The benchmark in the left half is the risk-free rate. The benchmark in the
right half is the stock market. The lower panel shows the volatility of the change in





AIG.N American International Group Inc
AMGN.O Amgen Inc
APC.N Anadarko Petroleum Corp
AXP.N American Express Co
BA.N The Boeing Company
BAC.N Bank of America Corp
BAX.N Baxter International Inc
BMY .N Bristol Myers Squibb Co




CSC.N Computer Sciences Corp
CSCO.O Cisco Systems Inc
CV X.N Chevron Corp
DD.N E I Du Pont De Nemours And Company
DELL.O Dell Inc
DIS.N Walt Disney Co
DOW.N The Dow Chemical Co
DV N.N Devon Energy Corp
F.N Ford Motor Co
FDX.N Fedex Corp
GE.N General Electric Co
GLW.N Corning Inc
GR.N Goodrich Corp
GS.N The Goldman Sachs Group Inc
HD.N The Home Depot Inc
HON.N Honeywell International Inc
HPQ.N Hewlett Packard Co
IBM.N International Business Machines Corp
INTC.O Intel Corp
JNJ.N Johnson & Johnson
JPM.N Jpmorgan Chase & Co
KFT.N Kraft Foods Inc
KO.N The Coca Cola Co
MCD.N McDonald's Corp
MDT.N Medtronic Inc
MO.N Altria Group Inc
MON.N Monsanto Co
MMM.N 3m Co
MRK.N Merck and Co Inc
MS.N Morgan Stanley
MSFT.O Microsoft Corp
LLY .N Eli Lilly And Co
LMT.N Lockheed Martin Corp
ORCL.O Oracle Corp
OXY .N Occidental Petroleum Corp
PFE.N Pzer Inc
PG.N Procter & Gamble Co
SLB.N Schlumberger NV
T.N AT&T Inc
TRV .N Travelers Companies Inc
TWX.N Time Warner Inc
TXN.N Texas Instruments Inc
UTX.N United Technologies Corp
V Z.N Verizon Communications Inc
WFC.N Wells Fargo and Co
WMT.N Wal Mart Stores Inc
WLP.N WellPoint Inc
XOM.N Exxon Mobil Corp
Table 9: The table gives the list of companies that are included in the analyses and
matches the company name with the company's RIC (= Reuters instrument code)
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